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Abstract 
 
Cloud computing is being adopted in critical 
sectors such as transport, energy and finance. This 
makes cloud computing services critical in 
themselves. When cyber attacks and cyber 
disruptions happen, millions of users are affected. A 
cyber disruption in this context means a temporary 
or permanent loss of service, with impact on users of 
the cloud service who rely on its continuity. Intrusion 
detection and prevention methods are being 
developed to protect this sensitive information being 
stored, and the services being deployed. There needs 
to be an assurance that the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of the data and resources are 
maintained.  This paper presents a background to 
the critical infrastructure and cloud computing 
progression, and an overview to the cloud security 
conundrum.  Analysis of existing intrusion detection 
methods is provided, in addition to our observation 
and proposed elastic scaling method for cloud 
security. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As more sectors adopt cloud services in their 
computing environment, the trend will also reach IT 
services operating critical infrastructure. Critical 
infrastructures are physical or mechanical processes 
mostly controlled electronically by systems, usually 
called supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) or process control systems (PCSs), 
composed of computers interconnected by networks. 
Examples include transportation, energy, 
telecommunications, and water. When critical 
infrastructures were first implemented, the security 
and protection of their management system was not a 
primary concern [1]. In recent years, critical 
infrastructure have become increasingly dependent 
on ICT; more interconnected and linked to the 
Internet. Consequently, this makes these systems 
more vulnerable and increases the risk of cyber-
attack [2].  
SCADA systems have evolved over the years 
from being monolithic, to distributed, to networked. 
Research has shown that cloud computing will 
eventually reach the IT services that are operating 
critical infrastructures [3–6]. There is a similarity 
between critical infrastructure and cloud computing, 
as they are primarily large distributed data sets and 
may possess the same underlying issues. The 
emergence of the cloud computing paradigm could 
be beneficial for the operation and performance of 
these complex infrastructures.   
With the technical development and market 
growth in cloud computing, organisations that 
provide, operate and maintain IT systems for critical 
infrastructure are making the decision as to when 
they should make the computing paradigm shift. 
Cloud services can offer efficient access to large IT 
infrastructures that benefit from the economy of 
scale. It would be highly desirable to maintain 
irrecoverable and valuable data obtained from 
critical infrastructure within secure cloud 
infrastructures [5]. However, the reality of today’s 
advanced malware and targeted attacks is that 100% 
protection is not realistic. Reducing attack vectors 
and marginalising the impact of an attack is the 
practical approach.  
The layout of this paper is as follows: Section 2 
provides background on critical infrastructure and 
their cloud computing progression, as well as cloud 
attributes and security concerns. Section 3 details 
existing approaches to detecting intrusions in the 
cloud environment. In Section 4 we present our 
observation and elastic scaling method for this 
protection problem. In Section 5 we evaluate our 
approach, and in Section 6 discuss some thoughts on 
this area. Our conclusions and future work are 
highlighted in Section 7.  
 
2. Background 
 
2.1. Critical infrastructure overview 
 
Critical infrastructures, such as the power grid 
and water distribution facilities, include a high 
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number of devices over a large geographical area. 
These infrastructures face significant threats as the 
growth in the use of industrial control systems such 
as SCADA systems, and their integration to 
networks in order to coordinate and manage the 
actions of these devices. The importance of 
protecting these infrastructures has been particularly 
highlighted by the increase in advanced persistent 
threats (APTs), such as ‘Stuxnet’ and ‘Duqu’, which 
were designed to target these control systems and 
disrupt their functionality [7]. Effective protection of 
SCADA systems is therefore crucial, as these are 
important components of critical infrastructures, and 
it is apparent that existing methods do not meet the 
security requirements of such interconnected 
infrastructures [4].  
The evolution of SCADA systems has also raised 
concerns about cyber-related vulnerabilities. The 
SCADA industry is transitioning from a legacy 
environment, in which systems were isolated from 
the Internet and focused on reliability instead of 
security, to a modern environment where networks 
are being leveraged to help improve efficiency. 
Traditionally, these infrastructures were 
inherently secure systems, as they were largely based 
on dedicated communication links. Nowadays, 
modern infrastructures make use of IT technologies, 
where wireless sensor networks (WSNs) with open 
access have become an integral part of virtually any 
critical infrastructure. Since IT infrastructures have 
become an integral part of almost all organisations, 
cloud computing will have a significant impact on 
them.  
Critical infrastructure currently makes use of the 
benefits offered by general IT services, so benefiting 
from the intricate cloud computing paradigm is 
expected. Embracing the cloud environment is a 
natural extension of remote access as it removes the 
requirement for the user to be in the same location as 
the infrastructure. Remote access to critical 
infrastructure is already common practice, i.e. remote 
access to intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) or user 
interfaces in a substation for maintenance. While this 
could provide improved performance, concerns over 
protecting sensitive data and services in this 
environment remain [8].  
Previous work of ours MacDermott et al. [4] has 
detailed a way in which critical infrastructure could 
utilise the cloud environment for improved 
performance and analysis of the automation 
processes. 
 
2.2. Cloud computing overview 
 
Cloud computing is a style of computing where 
elastic IT related capabilities are provided as an 
optimised, cost-effective and on-demand utility [9]. 
This can be considered as an evolution of e-business 
as cloud computing helps enterprises create and 
deliver IT solutions in a more flexible and cost-
effective way. Cloud providers usually build up large 
scale data centres and provide cloud users with 
computational resources in three service models:  
 
 Software as a Service (SaaS) 
 Platform as a Service (Paas) 
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
 
Figure 1 details these service models and gives 
examples of each [10]:  
 
 
FIGURE 1: SERVICE MODELS AND EXAMPLES  
 
There are security issues at each level of the cloud 
computing paradigm. These levels are application 
level, virtual level and physical level. The 
application level comprises of Software as a Service 
(SaaS), in which enterprises host and operate their 
applications over the Internet so that the customers 
can access it [11]. One benefit of this model is that 
customers do not need to buy software licences or 
any additional equipment for hosting the application.  
The virtual level includes Platform as a Service 
(PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). PaaS 
provides a platform for building and running 
customer applications. Enterprises can build 
applications without installing any tools on their 
local systems and can deploy them without many 
difficulties. IaaS provides a convenient option for 
organisations by transferring the IT infrastructure to 
the cloud provider. It is the responsibility of the 
cloud provider to tackle issues of  management, such 
as configuring servers, routers, firewalls to name a 
few [11].  
The physical level refers to the infrastructure 
upon which clouds are deployed. Security 
requirements and threats associated with each of 
these services are depicted in Table 1. 
Cloud deployment models include public, private, 
community and hybrid: 
 A public cloud is available to the general 
public or large industry group, owned by an 
organisation selling cloud services.  A third 
party provides infrastructure, platform and 
software. The management, operational and 
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security requirements are provisioned and 
shared between users and providers with a 
service level agreement (SLA).  
 A private cloud operates for a single 
organisation. The infrastructure can be 
located in the organisational unit or in a 
third party unit's data centre. Private clouds 
grant complete control over how data is 
managed and what security measures are in 
place. 
 A community cloud is shared by several 
organisations, supporting a specific 
community. The infrastructure is placed in 
more than one organisation in the 
community or third party's data centre. 
Management and operational tasks are split 
between data centre owner, organisations 
and third party.  
 Hybrid clouds are the combination of more 
than one cloud deployment model, as 
previously described. All the infrastructure, 
platform and software are portable and can 
switch between the deployment models in 
the hybrid architecture [13]. 
In cloud environments, network perimeters will 
no longer exist from the cloud user’s perspective, 
which renders traditional security protection 
methods, such as firewalls, inapplicable to cloud 
applications. The ability to clearly identify, 
authenticate, authorise and monitor who or what is 
accessing the assets of an organisation is essential.   
 
3. Detecting intrusions in the cloud 
environment 
 
Despite security issues delaying its adoption, 
cloud computing has already become an unstoppable 
force; thus, security mechanisms to ensure its secure 
adoption are an immediate need [14].  The 
distributed and open structure of cloud computing 
and services becomes an attractive target for 
potential cyber-attacks by intruders. The traditional 
intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS) 
are largely inefficient to be deployed in cloud 
computing environments due to their openness and 
specific essence [15]. In addition, the deployment of 
intrusion detection and prevention systems varies per 
solution and is something that is not cohesive in its 
approach.  
In the cloud environment, where massive amounts 
of data are generated due to high network access 
rates, an IDS must be robust against noise data and 
false positives. Since cloud infrastructure have 
TABLE 1: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND THREATS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SERVICE LEVEL.  
 
Level Service level Security requirements Threats 
Application 
level 
Software as a 
Service (SaaS) 
 Access control 
 Communication protection 
 Data protection from exposure  
 Privacy in multitenant environment 
 Service availability 
 Software security 
 Data interruption  
 Exposure in network  
 Interception 
 Modification of data at rest and in transit 
 Privacy breach 
 Session hijacking 
 Traffic flow analysis 
Virtual level Platform as a 
Service (PaaS), 
 
Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS) 
 Access control 
 Application security 
 Cloud management control security 
 Communication security 
 Data security  
 Secure images 
 Virtual cloud protection 
 
 Connection flooding 
 Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack 
 Defacement 
 Disrupting communications 
 Exposure in network 
 Impersonation 
 Programming flaws 
 Software modification 
 Software interruption  
 Session hijacking 
 Traffic flow analysis 
Physical level Physical data centre  Hardware security 
 Hardware reliability 
 Legal not abusive use of cloud 
computing 
 Network protection 
 Network resources protection 
 Network attacks 
 Connection flooding 
 Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack 
 Hardware interruption 
 Hardware theft 
 Hardware modification 
 Misuse of infrastructure 
 Natural disasters 
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enormous network traffic, traditional IDSs are not 
efficient to handle such a large data flow. Due to the 
large data sets, classification techniques require a 
huge amount of memory and CPU usage. 
Hamad and Al-Hoby [16]  implemented the Cloud 
Intrusion Detection Service (CIDS), which can be 
deployed by cloud providers to enable clients to 
subscribe with the IDS in a service-based manner, 
i.e. “Security-as-a-Service”. It is a re-engineered 
version of Snort, which is an open-source network 
IDS/IPS. The model outperforms currently used 
solutions for service-based IDS but at the same time 
provides minimal overhead to the case of traditional 
IDS deployment for single network protection. 
Dhage et al. [17], convey that when there is only 
one IDS in the entire network, the load on it 
increases as the number of host's increases. It is 
difficult to keep track of different kinds of attacks or 
intrusions, which are acting on each of the host 
present in the network. An architecture in which mini 
IDS instances are deployed between each user of the 
cloud and the cloud service provider is proposed. As 
a result, the load on each IDS instance will be less 
than that on a single IDS and for this reason, the 
small IDS instance will be able to do its work in a 
more efficient way.  
The work of Lee [18], proposes a multi-level IDS 
and log management method based on consumer 
behaviour for applying IDS effectively to the cloud 
system. They assign a risk level to users’ behaviour 
based on analysis of their behaviour over time. By 
applying differentiated levels of security strength to 
users based on the degree of anomaly increases the 
effective usage of resources. Their method proposes 
the classification of generated logs by anomaly level. 
This is so that the system administrator analyses logs 
of the most suspected users first.  
Lo et al. [19] present a cooperative intrusion 
detection system framework for cloud computing 
networks. They deploy an IDS in each cloud region, 
and each entity cooperates with each other through 
the exchange of alerts to reduce the impact of DoS 
attacks. A Snort based IDS is implemented and the 
three main modules are plugged into the system: 
block, communicate, defense. A co-operate agent is 
used to receive alerts from other IDSs, and they are 
analysed using a majority vote in order to determine 
the accuracy of results. If deemed a legitimate alert, 
the blocking rule is implemented. By co-operative 
operation among these agents, early detection and 
prevention technique is implemented. Therefore, 
IDSs deployed in cloud computing regions except 
the victim one could prevent this kind of attack. 
Randles and Lamb [20], focus on tackling 
distributed load balancing for cloud computing and 
present a comparative study of algorithms 
considered. It is expressed that as the system 
increases in size and complexity, the rule sets 
become unwieldy. This means that it may not be 
possible to maintain a viable monitoring and 
response cycle to manage the computational 
workload. For example, the execution of one rule 
may cause an event, triggering another rule set or set 
of rules, dependent on the current state. Methods are 
sought that promote load balancing on the global 
cloud scale via actions and interactions at the 
component level; however, a combination of 
algorithms seems clear. 
In Mahmood and Agrawal [21], the focus is on 
‘Principal Component Analysis Neural network 
Algorithm’ (PCANNA) which is used to reduce the 
number of computing resources, both memory and 
CPU time required to detect an attack. Feature 
reduction is used to remove useless information from 
the original high dimensional database of cloud 
traffic data. A back propagation algorithm is applied 
on reduced cloud traffic data for classification. Their 
contribution shows that dimensional reduction 
techniques help compact similar alerts and correlate 
alerts coming from heterogeneous platforms on 
several sites to detect intrusions that are more 
complex. 
Alsafi et al. [22] propose an integrated intrusion 
handling model for cloud computing, which 
combines anomaly and signature detection. Their 
focus is on stopping an attack, rather than detecting 
it. Actions their proposed method should take 
include terminating the user session that is being 
used during the attack, block access to the target 
from the offending user account, IP address, or other 
attacker attribute. The integrated model uses 
signature matching with normal traffic profiling to 
enhance attack detection. They propose to deploy 
their IDS in the virtual machine (VM) itself as well 
as the virtual network in order to monitor the 
activities within the system.  
Cloud defence strategy needs to be distributed so 
that it can detect and prevent the attacks that 
originate within the cloud itself and from the users 
using the cloud technology from different geographic 
locations through the Internet. As the popularity of 
the services provided in the cloud environment 
grows rapidly, the exploitation of possible 
vulnerabilities grows at the same pace.  
 
4. Our observation 
 
In the service-oriented architecture of the cloud, 
collaboration means data are coming from many 
different sources so existing IDS techniques will not 
be able to process data of this scale. Our survey of 
related work identified current weaknesses with 
existing approaches: 
 
 Overload with a high volume of traffic 
 Fail to scale to satisfy high speed networks 
 Loss of accuracy 
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 Inaccurate profile of usage 
 Require human intervention, which can slow 
down response time. 
 Simply flags suspect behaviour 
 High false alarm rate  
 Ineffective log management.  
 Cannot detect novel attacks.  
 
Distributed systems need to maintain a balance 
between communication overheads and the addition 
of process power, as resources can become 
constrained. Distributed IDS detect attacks by 
analysing large sets of traffic. This traffic is often 
analysed by taking a sample, and a large percentage 
of attacks can be detected quite quickly, whereas 
novel attacks are often missed.   
Since cloud computing supports a distributed 
service oriented paradigm, multi-domain and multi-
users administrative infrastructure, it is more prone 
to security threats and vulnerabilities, such as data 
breaches, data loss, service hijacking, denial of 
services (DoS) attacks, malicious insiders to name a 
few [9]. The Cloud Security Alliance report “Top 
Threats to Cloud Computing,” published in March 
2010 identified the following threats in their initial 
document: 
 
 Abuse and misuse of cloud computing 
 Insecure application programming interfaces 
 Malicious insiders 
 Shared technology vulnerabilities 
 Data loss 
 Data leakage 
 Account, service, and session hijacking 
The updated report published in 2013, entitled 
“The Notorious Nine – Cloud Computing Top 
Threats in 2013” [23] includes distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) as a key threat, not originally 
considered in 2010. By forcing the victim cloud 
service to consume inordinate amounts of finite 
system resources such as processor power, memory, 
disk space or network bandwidth, the attacker (or 
attackers, as is the case in DDoS attacks) causes an 
intolerable system slowdown and leaves all the 
legitimate service users confused.  
It can be inferred that as the use of cloud in 
organisations grows, so will the rate of denial of 
service attacks. These attacks against the cloud are 
launched to deny service availability to end users. 
While DDoS attacks tend to generate a lot of fear 
and media attention, they are by no means the only 
form of DoS attack. Asymmetric application-level 
DoS attacks take advantage of vulnerabilities in web 
servers, databases, or other cloud resources, allowing 
a malicious individual to take out  an application 
using a small attack payload – in some cases less 
than 100 bytes long [23]. 
Unavailability of services due to cloud outages 
can cause monetary loss to cloud providers and 
operational loss to cloud users. Hosting infrastructure 
services, and storing sensitive data in the cloud 
environment brings with it security and resilience 
requirements that existing cloud services are not well 
placed to address. IDS mechanisms require an 
extensive use of hardware, especially CPU and 
memory, and may cause unintentional resource 
exhaustion or a bottleneck. We undertook a 
comparison of current protection approaches for the 
cloud environment, to ensure that our approach 
would have a minimal impact on the clouds 
infrastructure and the services operating within. 
 
4.1. Analysis 
 
Traditional network monitoring schemes are not 
scalable to high-speed networks.  Where many 
solutions sample traffic, we believe sampling should 
fall within a prescribed error tolerance level. For 
detecting intrusions in the cloud environment, 
sampling costs are of paramount importance.  
A solution to the problems we have identified 
would have to encompass the following attributes:  
 
 Automate detection 
 Scalable 
 Elastic 
 Traffic filter/gateway entity 
 Improved efficiency over current methods 
 Nominal profile that updates as parameters 
adjust 
Our proposed approach, incorporating these 
attributes will use the resources of the cloud 
environment to sample at a higher resolution so it is 
has improved effectiveness. Our proposed traffic 
filter entity is effectively a gateway. It channels 
information from different cloud services and 
analyses them to determine an attack, e.g. DDoS. 
The measurements required to obtain a 
comprehensive view on the status of the cloud lead 
to the generation of a very large volume of data 
coming from multiple distributed locations. Hence, a 
scalable monitoring system should be able to 
efficiently collect, transfer and analyse such volume 
of data without impairing the operations of the cloud.  
The traffic filter entity needs to determine, firstly, 
if an attack is occurring. Many methods to detect 
intrusions have predefined thresholds or behaviours 
of their traits. In some cases, these could simply be 
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high surges of traffic and are legitimate. Our 
approach allows the traffic filter/gateway entity to 
scale out, using more resources of the cloud to 
balance the load of traffic and analyse in a higher 
resolution. When we start to see an attack, we scale 
out, i.e. clone/spawn the traffic filer service. It would 
be highly desirable to use the resources of the cloud 
to protect the cloud. 
There would be an elastic traffic filter in each 
cloud provider domain. The removal of the human 
element to analyse ‘flagged’ actions would improve 
the efficiency of the proposed approach, as this 
action would be automated. We need to design an 
algorithm to deal with distributed cloud attacks. 
Static sampling algorithms, such as Simple Random 
Sampling were originally considered as an efficient 
approach, however, they tend to oversample at peak 
periods when efficiency and timeliness are crucial, 
thus not ensuring the accuracy of estimation.  The 
biggest challenge in employing a sampling algorithm 
on a given network is scalability.  
Combining stateful and stateless signatures for 
attack detection, differs from related work that 
mainly employs one or two signature approaches. 
The main benefit from the combination is that not all 
malicious packets have to be inspected in order to 
ascertain the presence of an attack.  This improves 
detection efficiency and makes attack detection 
feasible within the routing infrastructure. 
 
4.2. Case Study 
 
A, B, C, and D represent services in a cloud 
environment. The traffic filter (TF) is a scalable 
gateway, through which communication between 
services in the cloud environment passes through as 
a normal occurrence. An exemplary scenario 
illustrating our proposed solution is illustrated in 
Figure 2: 
 
 
FIGURE 2: SERVICES IN A CLOUD ENVIRONMENT 
COMMUNICATING THROUGH THE TRAFFIC FILTER  
A-C are colluding to attack the cloud service. D is 
the target, and TF is the scalable traffic filter 
gateway. 
Service D (Victim) sends a request to Service A, B 
or C.  The Services attempt to send malicious traffic 
to the user/collusion. This could even be a flash 
crowd type attack. In this scenario, all the 
communication passes through the traffic filter, so 
there is a nominal profile of actions and behaviour 
stored.   
 
Analysis takes place in the following steps: 
 
Analysis Stage 1: Step 1: Anomaly detected. 
Analysis Stage 2: Step 2: Scale out/Spawn TF entity. 
Step 3:  Mitigate/Drop packets. 
There is no single point of failure as the traffic 
filter is elastic so it scales the analysis of traffic and 
balances this with the new entity it has spawned, as 
illustrated in Figure 3: 
 
FIGURE 3: TRAFFIC FILTER SCALING ITS RESOURCES 
TO BALANCE THE LOAD FOR ANALYSIS 
A flow diagram depicting the actions the traffic 
filter would take is presented in Figure 4: 
 
                           
 
FIGURE 4: FLOW DIAGRAM FOR TRAFFIC FILTER 
ACTIONS 
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Giving the traffic filter the ability to scale 
out/spawn its resources in order to balance the load 
of analysing the large volume of data means that it 
can use the resources of the cloud to analyse at a 
higher resolution. Figure 4 is a high level view of the 
actions that would be taken in our proposed solution. 
Ensuring that the analysis of traffic does not cause 
the entity to exceed its capacity is important, as this 
often happens with existing approaches that overload 
with a high volume of traffic. 
Much of the research in this area drops packets 
when they believe the traffic may be malicious, but 
this is often inaccurate. Additionally, some work 
sends a report or alert to the administrator or third 
party that an attack has just occurred. The ability to 
effectively analyse the large volume of data, through 
balancing the load means that the results will be 
more efficient, and appropriate actions can be taken. 
New algorithms optimised for detecting cloud 
attacks in an effective manner are needed. 
Additionally, having a solution with the ability to 
adapt to varying computational and network loads in 
order to not be invasive is needed also. 
 
5. Evaluation of approach 
 
It was originally considered a positive solution to 
detecting intrusions in the cloud environment. 
However, further research into implementing the 
traffic filter entity proved worrisome. When we were 
finalising designs, we concluded that if the 
communication between different services needs to 
go through the traffic filter, in practice it is hard to 
implement.  
It would be desirable for communication to go 
through the traffic filter/gateway in order to gain a 
consistent understanding of the occurring 
communication. In contrast, design requirements for 
intrusion detection systems should not affect current 
operations in any way. Otherwise, if the traffic filter 
entity needed to be modified and upgraded, the 
services would too. 
We concluded that the traffic filter could play 
some role for data collection, but not for a main 
player between different services. The use of agents 
to collect data could achieve the same operational 
objectives we desire, as they would not use 
operations to interfere with the current operation of 
services in the cloud. The use of independent agent 
entities that travel to and from services in the cloud 
environment, gather traffic logs and perform analysis 
could be applicable.  We are currently analysing the 
feasibility of enhancing elements of the existing 
cloud infrastructure, to provide the functionality we 
proposed for the traffic filter attributes.  
 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
One problem for this research environment is that 
there is no unified detection and prevention 
approach, or a globally accepted metric or standard 
to evaluate against. It is clear that an IDS alone 
cannot protect the cloud environment from attack. As 
such, there has been an increase in IDPS for this 
environment.  
Desired characteristics for IDPS include optimised 
performance, minimum error and maximum 
protection [15]. The ability to adapt to changes in 
user behavior and system behaviour over time is also 
anticipated. An IDPS should be part of normal 
services and not affect the operation of the cloud 
environment in any way. 
The structure of an IDPS is based upon two types: 
individual and collaborative. An individual 
arrangement of IDPS is achieved by physically 
integrating it within a firewall. A collaborative IDPS 
consists of multiple IDPSs over a large network 
where each one communicates with each other. Each 
IDPS has two main functional components: detection 
element and correlation handler. Detection elements 
consist of several detection components, which 
monitor their own sub-network or host individually 
and generate low-level alerts. The correlation handler 
transforms the low level alerts into a high level 
report of an attack [15].  
The current lack of collaboration among different 
components within a cloud provider or among 
different providers for detection or prevention of 
attacks is an area we aim to focus on. Cloud service 
providers have the scale and resources to address and 
prevent cyber-attacks in a more professional way 
than most other organisations [24]. We believe it is 
feasible to allow cloud providers to collaborate, as it 
would be beneficial for them if they could.  
Many solutions can only detect specific attacks, 
not unknown ones, and this is deterring the 
utilisation of the environment. A hybrid IDPS is 
needed for protecting the cloud environment from 
attack with optimised performance and protection 
with minimum error [15]. A hybrid approach 
combines two or more network intrusion detection 
techniques; signature based detection, anomaly based 
detection, and soft computing techniques.  Using a 
hybrid approach can improve the accuracy of the 
IDS when compared to individual approaches.  
Attacks and failures are inevitable; therefore, it is 
important to develop approaches to understanding 
the cloud environment under attack. Investigation 
into the appropriate ‘points’ in the cloud to deploy 
monitoring and attack detection functionality is 
imperative.  
The four areas considered for deployment are in 
the VM, in the hypervisor or host system, in the 
virtual network, or in the traditional network.  
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 In the VM: Deploying a solution in the VM 
allows you to monitor the activity within the 
system, and detect and alert on issues that 
may rise. 
 In the hypervisor or the host system: 
Deploying a solution in the hypervisor 
allows you not only to monitor the 
hypervisor, but anything travelling between 
VMs on that hypervisor. It is a more central 
location for intrusion detection, but there 
may be performance issues or dropping of 
some information if the amount is too large. 
 In the virtual network/VLAN: Deploying a 
solution to monitor the virtual network 
allows you to monitor the network traffic 
between VMs on the host, as well as traffic 
between the VMs and host. This 'network' 
traffic never hits the traditional network. 
 In the traditional network: Deploying a 
solution here allows you to monitor, detect, 
and alert on traffic that passes over the 
traditional network infrastructure. However, 
this is quite problematic as we may miss 
virtual traffic as it is encrypted. 
We believe the optimal deployment location is on 
the virtual network/VLAN. To communicate 
between VMs, they talk over a virtual network. This 
would be a suitable place for an IDPS as 
communicating occurs through this point, and it 
would be easier to build a nominal profile of 
activities and behaviours. The use of a module that 
uses signature analysis of captured attack statistics, 
but also utilises a behaviour module to determine if 
the detected occurrence is actually an attack. This 
could in turn improve efficiency over current 
methods that only utilise one method.  
 
7. Conclusions and future work 
 
Critical infrastructure vendors will inevitably take 
advantage of the benefits offered by the cloud 
computing paradigm, but while this may offer 
improved performance and scalability, the associated 
security threats deter this progression. This paper has 
shown our plans to build upon our initial research 
into protecting services in the cloud environment, 
through our proposed elastic scaling method for 
cloud security. Our future work includes enhancing 
the attributes of our method and measuring how an 
attack against the cloud's infrastructure would affect 
performance. New algorithms optimised for 
detecting cloud attacks in an efficient manner are 
needed, and this is something we will explore 
further.  
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